From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools by Currie, Adrian
1 
 
From Models-as-fictions to Models-as-tools 
Penultimate Version, forthcoming in Ergo 
Adrian Currie 
Abstract 
Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: scientists interact with 
models in ways analogous to various aesthetic objects. Fictionalists follow most other accounts 
of modeling by taking them to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some 
resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects 
of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models 
sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. In 
such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while 
fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or 
interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such 
content—all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs.  I take these 
points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. I articulate and 
defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular 
uses in particular contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
Fictionalism about scientific models captures crucial insights about the often rich, 
sophisticated content of models and how modellers interact with them. However, I’ll argue that 
such accounts fall short of handling some of the dynamic, world-directed purposes that models 
serve in engineering and design. In brief, fictionalism requires that the world-directed success of 
models turns on their adequately representing some target system. However, engineering 
models often serve as scaffolds for the construction of real-world systems as well as further 
models. As such, their success doesn’t turn on their representing target systems, or further 
fictional systems, as fictionalists require. In such cases there is no resemblance between a model 
and a pre-existing part of the world because the model is involved in constructing that system 
and, during engineering and design, there is a dynamic relationship between the two. Further, I’ll 
argue that some of the uses models are put to do not require that they be understood as fictions. 
On my view, this motivates a more pragmatic account of modeling, one which takes them to be 
tools: material objects which are put to some use. I’m not the first to suggest an account like this 
(see, in particular, Knuuttila 2011, Boumans 2012), however, previous work has lacked both 
precision—an account of what a tool is—and an explanation of how it captures the insights of 
fictionalism. In what follows I’ll tackle both. I’ll start with an example of the kind of modelling 
we’re concerned with. I’ll then discuss fictionalist views and argue that they cannot 
accommodate such models, before turning to my positive account. 
2. Models in Design 
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My father is a hydraulics engineer, primarily busy with designing, and monitoring the 
construction and functioning of, large pumps for extracting water from artesian wells. In so 
doing, he interacts with a number of more-or-less idealized theoretical objects—models. These 
aid him by being simplified, easily tractable and manipulable proxies.  
The process of selecting a pump comes in three stages. First, a location is selected for the 
future pump, and a well is drilled. Water is drawn from the well in order to calculate the draw-
down curve. This tells us how much the aquifer’s ‘head’ (the top of the water) will descend as 
water is pumped.  
Second, we reach a proxy stage. The draw-down curve and the project’s requirements are 
used in combination with some fairly simple models to work out how much water, at what rate, 
could be drawn from the well, and how much power would be required in doing so. One such 
model is the mass-flow equation, which treats pipe friction pressure as proportional to the 
square of the flow. That is, as water flow increases, the amount of friction pressure from the pipe 
increases exponentially. This is important for understanding the pressure the pump will need to 
overcome, and the amount of ‘suction’ required to lift water from the well into its new location 
(a storage tank, for instance). For a particular design scenario, further details are added, leading 
to equations like the following: 
Ptmax = Hwd - Hwsmin + Hd + Pd(Q/Qt)2 
 
Ptmax is the maximal pump pressure required to lift the water to the delivery pipe discharge 
in the storage tank. This value matters for the next stage, when we select our pump. Variable 
Hwd is the well draw-down amount at flow Q. This was the value established in the first stage. 
The pressure the pump must produce is dependent on variable Hwsmin, the minimal level of the 
well over summer; constant Hd, the distance between the tank’s floor and the height of the 
delivery pipe’s discharge, and variable Pd, the pipe friction loss at flow Q (which is determined by 
the mass-flow equation). By determining Ptmax, a system curve is generated which provides a 
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profile of the capacities of a pump which would manage maximal well capacity. However, this 
model is only preliminary: it does not provide the minimal pump pressure required to lift the 
water to the delivery pipe discharge in the storage tank, and it assumes a particular type of pipe 
and its characteristic friction coefficient. The actual capacity depends on atmospheric and water 
vapour pressure, specific characteristics of the well, and seasonal well level variations. With some 
of these details added, further models generate hydraulic curves (which map total head against 
flow volume) for that particular scenario. Which is to say, curves for that particular well, 
particular delivery pipe and particular storage tank. Although it is technically unnecessary, my 
father often draws schematic hydraulic line diagrams to aid in his understanding and imagining of 
the future pump: 
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2-1 Hydraulic line diagram 
In the third stage, a computer program selects the optimal pump design given the 
requirements of the calculations: one which can handle both the minimal and maximal pressures, 
and those in between. This is, in effect, carried out by comparing the hydraulic curves from step 2 
to the performance curves of various pumps. That which most efficiently meets the requirements 
is selected and ordered. 
In short, in pump selection my father interacts with the actual well site at the initial stage—
determining the well draw-down curve. Otherwise, he utilizes proxies: simple, theoretical 
models, schematic diagrams, imagined content, and geometric curves. 
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A fictionalist about models takes my father to be interacting with these proxies similarly to 
how he interacts with the high-fantasy novels he enjoys1. That is, models have fictional content: 
they are representational as literary fiction is. Although some of the time—quite often—a 
modeller does treat her model in fictional terms, such views do not capture some of the proxies 
used by my father in pump selection. Fictionalists (and many other views, of course) take models 
to inform us about the world in virtue of there being some kind of resemblance relation between 
the model and the target system. However, the effectiveness of the model utilized in the second 
stage above doesn’t turn on its resembling the real world: it is intended to scaffold further model 
construction. More crucially, although the model is directed towards the pump and the well site, 
there isn’t an instantiated target system per se: after all, the well hasn’t been built yet. Second, 
the use of models in the third stage doesn’t require a fictional relationship: my father simply must 
be convinced that the required inputs will generate the required outputs. 
None of this suggests that fictionalism doesn’t account for many aspects of modeling 
practice. Rather, it suggests that fictionalism about models must be supplemented, or, by my 
account, subsumed into a larger framework. As Adam Toon (2011) has said, “… the real test of 
fiction-based approaches must be whether they can provide a coherent overall account of 
scientific modeling” (580). I do not question fictionalism’s coherence, but its completeness. 
Instead of viewing fictionalism as a full account of models, then, we should take it as one aspect 
of a broader set of activities. I’ll argue that a tool-based view can account for both fictionalism 
and that broader set. 
3. Three Questions about Theoretical Models. 
Right out of the gate, it’s important to note an ambiguity about philosophical appeals to 
fictionalism regarding models. That is, ‘fictionalism’ can be understood in two different ways, 
                                                             
1 See, for instance, Cartwright 1983, Frigg 2010, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Toon 2010, 2012, Levy 2012, 2015. 
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which are logically independent. On one hand, fictionalism is contrasted with realism; realists 
take models to provide literally true descriptions of the world, fictionalists take them to be 
descriptions of fictions—they disagree over the referent of model content. On the other hand, 
we can contrast fictionalists with structuralists. For a structuralist, the representational capacity 
of models is restricted to the formal and the mathematical; models describe trajectories through 
state spaces, relationships between variables, and geometric properties. Fictionalists take the 
content of models to be richer: models carry concrete content. For the structuralist, the mass-
flow equation expresses a linear relationship between two variables, while the fictionalist claims 
that it expresses two physical qualities, properties or forces and their interaction. 
So, the first fictionalist is interested in the referent of model content; the second is interested 
in the nature and expressive power of models. Although these are related, I will only be 
concerned with the latter view in this paper. 
For my purposes, fictionalists target three main questions about models (c.f. Frigg 2010). 
Let’s call the first the semantic question: when are claims about models true? When my father 
says, for example, “pipe friction pressure is exponentially proportional to flow”, according to 
what rules is the statement true or false? For the fictionalist, this question is analogous to 
enquiring after claims internal to fictions such as “The little prince lived on a small planet”.  
Answers to the semantic question constrain, but do not decide, answers to the second 
question: the metaphysical question. Here, we ask what a model is—you might say, we ask after 
the truth-makers of claims about models. Often fictionalists are motivated by deflationism about 
the metaphysical question: insofar as they can, they try to minimize the metaphysical 
commitments required by their view. Prima facie, stipulating fictional possibilia brings 
metaphysical costs, which fictionalists typically seek to avoid (Toon 2012, Levy 2012, Thomson-
Jones 2010). 
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Finally, fictionalists try to answer the model-world question. Scientific models have epistemic 
powers, they are taken to inform us about the real world—even as they diverge dramatically 
from being accurate descriptions of it. In virtue of what can they do this?  
In the next section I sketch how fictionalists answer the semantic, metaphysical, and model-
world questions, which sets us up for the objections in section 5, and will be important for 
demonstrating how a tool-based view can accommodate fictionalism in section 6. 
4. Fictionalism about Models 
As we saw above, a basic motivation behind fictionalism is a commitment to a concrete as 
opposed to an abstract (or structural) view of models. To begin, distinguish between a model’s 
content and its vehicle. A model’s content is what it expresses. The mass-flow equation, for 
instance, expresses a relationship between two variables: friction and flow. It tells us that as flow 
increases, friction increases exponentially. A model’s vehicle is the object which ‘carries’ that 
content—its medium. A hydraulic line diagram is a vehicle which in part expresses the mass-flow 
model’s content. An abstract view of models claims that a model’s content is exhausted by 
structural or relational features (see, for instance, Suarez 2003, Giere 1988, Weisberg 2013)2. In 
effect, a model says only mathematical things. According to fictionalists, taking models as 
abstracta in this sense is too thin: many models do not seem to have mathematical content, or 
mathematical content alone. This is clear enough in some cases: when my father runs a mental 
simulation of water running through a pump, or builds a scale model, or sketches a hydraulic line 
diagram, it is hard to see how we could understand such models as abstracta. They seem to 
express concrete content. In theoretical cases, too, the content of a model appears to outrun 
mere structure. The mass-flow equation, for instance, seems to express facts about pipe 
                                                             
2 The term ‘abstract’ is notoriously difficult (Lewis 1986) except where noted I will take an abstract 
entity to be one which only possesses structural properties (Thomson-Jones 2010, Levy 2015). 
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pressure—not merely variables. Moreover, it is somewhat unclear how we are to compare the 
abstract properties of models—variables, state-spaces, and so on—to the world’s concrete 
properties. And indeed, when models do say things about the world, they do not appear to do 
this in a straight-forward way. It is not literally true that the water in a pumping station acts as my 
father’s model represents it: factors such as variation in well levels also affect pump pressure. 
There is no simple mapping between abstract properties and concrete properties3 (see Thomson-
Jones 2010, Levy 2015 and Frigg 2010 for more detailed treatments). Moreover, mere structural 
properties don’t do justice to the manipulability and physicality of models in virtue of which they 
enable such dynamic interactions with modellers themselves (Knuuttila 2011). Finally, Fiora Salis 
has recently argued that sophisticated structuralist accounts such as Weisberg’s ultimately rely 
on fictionalist content after all (2016)4.  
By taking models as concrete, model-to-world relations can be understood as comparisons 
between (or descriptions of) concrete properties. Moreover, the non-mathematical features of 
models are easily accommodated. A further motivation is the ‘face value practice’ (Thomson-
Jones 2010) of modeling: undoubtedly scientists discuss and interact with models in a way which 
makes fictionalism attractive (see Toon 2011, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Weisberg 2013 chap 4).  
However, appealing to models as expressing or possessing concrete properties doesn’t get 
us far in answering the questions posed above. To fill-out their views, fictionalists appeal to 
positions developed in aesthetics. In effect, taking models as fictions provides a conduit for 
applying conceptual machinery about fictions to models. This allows philosophers to attempt the 
tightrope between staying true to modeling practice while avoiding costly metaphysical 
commitments. The most promising attempts at this trick co-opt Kendall Walton’s view of fiction. 
                                                             
3 See Michael Weisberg (2013) for a response to these species of worry. 
4 This is due to Weisberg’s reliance on modellers construing the structural properties of models ‘as if’ 
they are instantiated: “Fictions are crucial to [Weisberg’s] understanding of the model world relation to 
the extent that model construals involve apparent reference to hypothetical systems having features 
(attributes and mechanisms) that only concrete objects can have” (2016, 257).  
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I’ll focus on these, but it’s important to note that I intend the objections in the next section to 
apply to any fictionalist account—or for that matter, any account of modelling generally—which 
requires a resemblance relation between a model and a target system, and which puts strong 
enough emphasis on the imagination for successful model uses. 
A way into the philosophy of fiction is via notions of fictional truth. In virtue of what is it true, 
say, that “The Little Prince lived on a very small planet (perhaps B-612) with three volcanoes, two 
extinct and one active”? Especially, how can it be true when the actual world has never contained 
a little prince living on a very small planet? The answer is to take the above sentence to refer to 
some fictional, rather than the actual, world. It could be paraphrased as: “according to Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry’s story, the Little Prince lived on a very small planet (and so on…)”. So, fictions 
have ‘internal’ truths: propositions which are true according to the fiction. The challenge is 
working out where these internal truths come from. One could take fictions to refer to sets of 
possibilia: “the Little Prince lived on a very small planet” is true just in case, across the set of 
possible worlds which cohere with what is said in Saint-Exupéry’s story, that sentence is true. This 
has nice semantic features, but is rather problematic metaphysically speaking (see, for instance, 
Thomasson 1999, chapter 1). What do we take these possibilia to be? Positing a real, concrete 
group of physical Princes meeting Saint-Exupéry’s description is metaphysically rash. Moreover, 
presumably the author of the work isn’t merely describing possibilia; Saint-Exupéry created his 
characters.  
The trick in the metaphysics of fiction, then, is to capture a notion of ‘internal’, or ‘fictional’ 
truth, while so far as possible limiting one’s metaphysical commitments and keeping in tune with 
the actual practices of creating and consuming literature. 
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Kendall Walton’s approach is to take fictions as games of make-believe (Walton 1990)5. Such 
games are facilitated by props: material objects which, in combination with various ‘rules of 
generation’ demand that players imagine certain propositions as true. Children playing lava use 
material objects—furniture and the floor—as props. According to the game, the floor is ‘lava’, 
while the furniture is safe. The claim ‘Eloise fell into the lava, she is dead’ is true, according to the 
game of make-believe, just in case Eloise touched the floor. The rules of the game and the props 
prescribe such an act of imagining. Claims in literary fictions work similarly: the various realizers 
of Saint-Exupéry’s story—books, performances, and so forth—are props which, in combination 
with some set of rules, demand that people consuming the fiction imagine such-and-such to be 
the case. 
It is important to note that Walton’s view involves a special notion of ‘representation’. 
Contrast a broad sense of representation with Walton’s more narrow conception. Broadly 
speaking, in order to represent, an object must have propositional content. For it to be a 
representation of another object, that content must be ‘about’ that object. By contrast, in 
Walton’s usage, something represents just in case it is a prop in a game of make-believe. This is a 
narrower usage; for Walton ‘represent’ is a term of art. The semantic question asks how models 
represent in the context of fiction, the model-world question asks how models might be about 
the world. As we’ll see, although Walton-style fictionalism provides a compelling answer to the 
former question in some contexts (but not all), it must be supplemented to answer the latter 
question. In the next section, I’ll complain about both the requirement that models are 
representational in Walton’s sense, and about the supplements that have been attempted to 
answer the model-world question. 
                                                             
5 Walton himself is not so motivated by metaphysical deflation; but fictionalists about models certainly 
are. 
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So, Walton’s view looks ripe for coopting by those concerned with the metaphysics of 
models (Levy 2015, Frigg 2010 and Toon 2012 are prominent examples). The mechanics of truths 
about models can be straightforwardly transferred. Modellers interact with various props—say, 
inscriptions of equations, or computer software, or perhaps the model’s target itself—and these 
encourage acts of imagining, thus generating internal truths. The props are the model’s vehicle 
(or alternatively the part of the world the model targets), and internal truths are generated by 
the games such vehicles prescribe. This answers the semantic question. But this doesn’t tell us 
how it is that models say true things of the world: the model-world question. Similarly, The Little 
Prince is a partly allegorical work—from reading it, we are supposed to learn about the nature of, 
say, adulthood in the actual world. The world of adults in The Little Prince is absurd, and this 
absurdity is reflected in our own world. We can categorize fictionalists by how they characterize 
this mode of theorizing. First, indirect accounts take the model-world relationship to be mediated 
by some further object—the model. Second, by direct accounts the model is, in some sense, a 
description: there is no mediation. 
To see the difference between direct and indirect views, a tripartite distinction first drawn by 
Ron Giere (1988) will be helpful (see also Godfrey-Smith 2006). On this picture, we should 
distinguish between model descriptions, model systems and target systems. The model system is 
whatever it is that modellers directly examine. It is, in Godfrey-Smith’s terms, whatever is “… 
analyzed, described and argued about…” (2009, 102) in modeling. Answering the metaphysical 
question involves an account of model systems. Model descriptions specify model systems: they 
could be a set of equations (perhaps written down, carried in someone’s head, or realized on a 
computer), an image, a material object, or whatever (I assume we can equate a model 
description with its vehicle). A target system is the part of the world we take the model to be 
informative of. My father might specify a model system using a mass-flow equation, and take this 
to inform him about his target system, a pump. 
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For indirect fictionalists, most well realized by Roman Frigg and collaborators (Frigg 2010, 
Frigg & Nguyen 2016), but also discussed by Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009), the model-world 
question is achieved through property comparisons: 
… truth conditions for transfictional statements (in the context of scientific modelling) 
come down to truth conditions for comparative statements between properties… All 
that matters from a semantic point of view is that the apparent comparison with a 
nonexistent object eventually comes down [to] the unproblematic comparison of 
properties (Frigg 2010 263). 
The fiction somehow licences, ‘puts on the table’, the relevant fictional properties, and thus 
comparisons between them and actual properties. We might ask whether shifting the 
metaphysical burden from abstract objects to uninstantiated properties is less metaphysically 
onerous (Levy 2015). More problematically, it is not obvious how comparisons between 
instantiated and uninstantiated properties can yield truths about the world (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 
Salis 2016)6. Although Frigg & Nguyen provide an expanded indirect account, they do not specify 
how the model-world connection is made, as “This question has no straightforward answer and 
much depends on one’s ontological commitments” (239). Even with a good story of property-
comparisons in hand, this won’t avoid my objections in section 5, which turn on modeling 
requiring an explicit comparison between some model system and some target system. 
Direct fictionalists aim for a cleaner metaphysical plate. Both approaches agree that internal 
claims about models work according to Walton’s machinery. However, they differ on the 
metaphysics and model-world question. Where indirect fictionalists take a model system to be a 
game of make-believe, direct fictionalists, in a sense, deny there is a model system at all. 
                                                             
6 As Salis has put it, “There is no rabbit population instantiating the properties that are compared to 
those of a real rabbit population. So, on this interpretation, model-world comparisons are still false” (2016, 
257). 
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Direct fictionalists suggest we take model systems to be descriptions of target systems (Levy 
2012, 2015, Toon 2012 explicitly, although Strevens (2008 chapter 7) could potentially be read in 
these terms). On this view, a model is more like a metaphor than a fiction: we describe our target 
in a way which emphasizes some aspects over others.  
My suggestion is that we treat models as games of prop orientated make-believe – where 
the props, as it were, are the real-world target phenomena. To put the idea more plainly: 
models are special descriptions, which portray a target as simpler (or just different) than 
it actually is (Levy 2015, 791). 
This suggestion overturns the idea that models are indirect representations of target 
systems. The immediate advantage is the avoidance of comparing either nonexisting fictional 
entities or nonexisting fictional properties with the existing world. There is simply the world and 
our interaction with it. This answers the metaphysical question, and internal truths are generated 
as they are for indirect fictionalists—via the props and rules of generation. As is the case for 
indirect fictionalism, direct fictionalists such as Adam Toon are often reticent on the model-world 
question7. 
Arnon Levy is an exception, explicitly targeting the model-world question. The model just is a 
description of the world; the props are identified with the target system. However, the model is 
still a false description of the world: and so, how should we understand the model-world relation? 
Levy takes the relation to be one of partial truth. Roughly, the notion of partial truth involves 
parceling up propositions or sentences into components, which are themselves true or false (see 
Yablo 2014). So, the content of complex sentences can be understood as consisting in several 
parts, each with their own truth conditions. As opposed to conceiving of ‘truth’ as ranging over 
                                                             
7 Salis (2016) provides a fictionalist account of the model-world relationship, but she doesn’t discuss, 
and it isn’t clear to me, whether it can manage the problem cases in section 5. 
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full sentences, it ranges over these sentence parts. A sentence is ‘partially true’ when at least one 
of its parts is true. Let’s take a fictional example, considering Romeo in act 2 scene 2: 
But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks? 
It is the east, and Juliet is the Sun. 
The last sentence is, of course, false—even in the fiction: Juliet is a 13 year old human female, 
not a star. However, we could very roughly understand the sentence as composed of two parts: 
“Juliet is at the eastern window” and “Juliet is the sun”. Naturally, it loses something in the 
translation, but I take it that according to Shakespeare’s fiction, the former sentence is true and 
the latter is false. The metaphor, then, could be understood as being partially true in Yablo’s 
sense. Similarly, Levy suggests that we partition the false and true aspects of the model’s content 
in virtue of which it says something true (when it does!) about its target system. On this kind of 
view, we should take my father’s model pump to be a description of the actual pump—perhaps 
something akin to its blueprints, or a map. Aspects of a map’s representational content are true 
and aspects are false. A map gets it right when it gets it right in the relevant respects. Models are 
direct, rather than indirect, representations. 
The purpose of going into this amount of detail about fictionalist views is two-fold. First, it is 
important to see that the two objections I provide in section 5 are not solved by the kinds of 
precisifications attempted by Levy, Frigg, and company. These all turn on there being (1) a more-
or-less explicit resemblance relationship between the model (or description) and some target 
system, and (2) that models-qua-models necessarily demand certain acts of imagining on the 
modeller’s part. On my view, both commitments are problematic in engineering or design 
contexts. Second, my aim in section 6 is to encompass the successful parts of fictionalism into a 
broader account, and seeing how this operates requires a firm grounding in varieties of 
fictionalism. 
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5. Fictionalism & Design 
In what follows, I do not deny that models are representational in a broad sense: that they 
are ‘about’ target systems and function as proxies. Rather, I deny that this aboutness is captured 
in fictionalist terms. First, both direct and indirect fictionalists answer the model-world question 
in terms of there being some resemblance between a model and a fixed target system. For Frigg, 
this is a property-comparison; for Levy, a relation of partial truth. But there are world-directed 
uses of models where their purpose is to scaffold both further models and the construction of 
‘target’ systems themselves. As such, there seems to be no good target for the property 
comparison or the truth-relation, and moreover the success of the model explicitly doesn’t rely 
on this. Second, for fictionalists, being a Walton-style representation is essential to modeling. But 
models are not representational in the same way that fictions are. That is, they are not essentially 
representational. Stripped of representational content, a literary fiction is no fiction. That is to 
say, it is plausible that possessing fictional representational content is a necessary condition for 
something to count as a fiction. However, models may be—in fact often are—stripped of such 
content. Fictions qua fictions—as opposed to, say, inscriptions, or mistaken non-fictional reports, 
are always (Walton-style) representations. Models qua models are not. As I’ll make explicit, both 
problem cases arise in the modelling work I described at the paper’s beginning. 
Philosophers considering models often speak as if, when considering the model-world 
relation, there are two kinds of models: ‘general’ models which in some sense lack targets 
(although see Levy 2015), and what Weisberg calls ‘targeted models’ (2013), those concerned 
with representing a particular system. However, the use of models to scaffold further model 
construction, and to design and construct physical systems, represent a third class which, I’ll now 
argue, fictionalists cannot account for. 
17 
 
During the pump selection process my father will often utilize models whose features are 
geared towards the specific site, and the particular pump he intends to select, so they are not 
general or targetless models. Determining pump suction requires taking atmospheric pressure 
into account, and as atmospheric pressure changes both with altitude, the position of the pump, 
and the depth of the well, these factors make specific differences to how we model the pump. 
However, the pump has not been selected as yet: the specific target appears to lack an 
extension. What, then, does the model describe or represent? Presumably either a future object 
(the pumping station that will be built) or some kind of nonexistent object (the pumping station 
intended to be built). What do these cases look like on fictionalist views? On an indirect view we 
are, presumably, comparing abstract properties to either future properties or further abstract 
properties. But these future properties are either indeterminate (depending on how the world 
turns out), or our epistemic access to them is mysterious.  
On direct views, it is unclear what we should take the props to be. They could be, for 
instance, the well site—the object concurrent with the selection process. Alternatively, they 
could be the future object—the completed pump. Perhaps we should view the model as a 
prediction about the future state; the model describes a future object. However, we cannot take 
these models to be in the business of predicting future states. This is because they are 
preliminary: they are a way of getting the selection process off the ground. These early designs 
and models are often abandoned, functioning as scaffolding for yet more detailed models. Such 
preliminary models typically succeed in their task: forming a basis for further design, necessary 
for the final product. The journey from an initial proposal to a complete pumping station is a long 
one, each step frequently involving the mediation of various proxies—and their abandonment. 
This suggests that thinking of models in terms of partial truths or property comparison is 
insufficient to capture the use of models: frequently, an explicit resemblance relation between 
model and world doesn’t enter into it. 
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So, fictionalist construals of modeling answer the model-world question by positing a kind of 
relationship between the fictional content of the model and the nature of the target system. In 
engineering cases, the model’s target is in some sense unspecified—perhaps is itself an 
indeterminate fictional object, or perhaps the target is an object in the future. However, the 
success of the model’s world-directed task is not to be partially true of the future object, nor to 
promote property comparisons between two fictional objects. Rather, the function of the model 
is to scaffold the construction of models which themselves are used for pump construction or 
selection. Moreover, there is often a dynamic relationship between models and targets in design 
contexts. Which pump we select, and the properties of the eventual pumping station, are not 
simply decided by the ‘final’ model, rather, the model—and the physical properties of the 
pump—are often updated in virtue of ongoing changes in context. 
A further objection to the idea that fictionalist accounts can provide a general, complete 
account of modeling practice arises from considering the models used in the last stage of pump-
selection. This objection hits the use of Walton’s specific sense of ‘representation’: that to 
represent, a fiction must be a prop in a game of make-believe. That is, for models to be models 
they must demand certain acts of imagining. Recall that the mass-flow equation, when taken as a 
veridical description of the world is, strictly speaking, false. There are two possible senses of 
‘false’ here. First, the equation represents pipe friction as if it were not affected by, say, 
atmospheric pressure—it is non-veridical in a way similar to how the floor in a game of lava is not 
hot. Second, the output of the equation will be inexact: it will not predict pipe friction in a fine-
grained way. Michael Weisberg (2006, 2013) calls these ‘representational’ and ‘dynamic’ fidelity. 
Representational fidelity is concerned with matching a model’s structure to the target’s; dynamic 
fidelity matches the outputs of model and target systems. In different contexts we care more-or-
less about each desiderata. As a first pass, it seems as if when we care about dynamic fidelity—
matching a model’s output to the world—we are not required to take models as representations 
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in Walton’s sense. After all, in such circumstances we only care that the model provides the 
appropriate output.  
In the third stage of pump selection, a pump is picked from amongst the standard options by, 
effectively, matching the curve generated by the pipe equation to the curve relating to the 
pressure output of each particular pump. This process is carried out automatically: a piece of 
computer software matches pump to well. This ensures that a pump is selected which is able to 
overcome the pressure, flow and friction from the required volumes of water. There is a broad 
sense in which the pump-curves ‘represent’ features of the pipe. But they do not do so as 
fictionalists require. That is, their functioning does not turn on their being props which demand 
certain imaginings in games of make-believe. It is hard to see how this could be so, given that the 
matching process is carried out by a computer. Moreover, even if the task was carried out by a 
human, they wouldn’t have to know what they were actually doing—selecting the optimal pump 
given the requirements of the case—to successfully achieve the task. All they would need to do is 
match the curves as best they could. Such models could be used as props, but this makes no in-
principle difference to their capacity to perform the task. In short, the model’s success doesn’t 
require that it licenses games of make-believe. 
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One may object that in designing the models we must take them as representational in 
Walton’s sense. That is, designing a model requires that we partake in the relevant game of 
make-believe (via more-or-less explicitly specifying a set of rules of generation and constructing 
some prop). Even if this is right, I don’t see how the point carries over to the model’s function 
once it is constructed. It might be a necessary condition that, were the model to be taken as a 
representation in those terms, it would generate the relevant truths. But this is a weak condition: 
presumably any object could operate as any number of props in any number of games. Further, 
one might argue that non-fictional models are not models. This strikes me as unmotivated—my 
father utilizes a range of proxies to aid his selecting of a real-world pump. These proxies play a 
variety of roles, some fictional and others not, but all are surely part of the activity of modeling. I 
imagine that many might be attracted to this last point, since such cases are not viewed as 
problem cases, but are simply excluded from accounts of modelling. However, such exclusions 
seem ad hoc. If modeling accounts are supposed to be exhaustive, then we should prefer an 
account which happily accommodates them. 
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We can take the case study which opened the paper, then, as involving three kinds of models, 
delineated in terms of their function. First, preliminary models. In pump selection, models are 
constructed in stages, preliminary models acting as scaffolds for more detailed, more targeted 
models. Preliminary models are often used to aid in the imagining of the final product, but are 
not properly understood in fictionalist terms because their success does not turn on their saying 
(approximately) true things, or being (approximately) accurate representations, or possessing 
any other sufficiently detailed resemblance relation with a target system. Their role is to provide 
a basis to build further models in a dynamic interaction with the target system, and thus they play 
a crucial role in how the designed object turns out. This is world-directed—the purpose of the 
model is to build something, after all—but its success in that world-directed function does not 
turn on its partial truth, or on property comparisons. Preliminary models make trouble for any 
account which cashes out model-world relations in terms of resemblance (thus including many 
structuralist accounts).  
Second, fictional models. These, like the model which my father uses to determine the 
required properties of the future pump, do function as the fictionalist would have it. Which is to 
say, the models act as props which urge games of make-believe by which the model says true 
things of the future pump.  
Third, procedural models—we see these in the final stage, where the optimal pump design is 
selected. In this context, the model fulfilling its function doesn’t require that it be 
representational. Here, we simply care about its output: by matching the well system curves to 
pump pressure curves, the right selection is identified. To do so, we do not need to take the well 
system curves or the pump pressure curves as representing wells or pumps in Walton’s sense. We 
simply need to know that following this procedure will provide the result we need. 
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The lesson is that—particularly in engineering—there are world-directed uses of models 
which fictionalists cannot account for8.  
6. Models as Tools 
In this section I coopt work from the philosophy of artifacts to argue that we should 
understand models as tools. 
The content of a story is determined by the rules of generation and the props. The author 
controls these via how they design the props (say, the words they write). A model’s content, by 
contrast, depends upon what use it is put to. Sometimes, my father might use the mass-flow 
equation in an explanatory context, for instance, in accounting for how some pump has 
malfunctioned. Here, a fictionalist treatment is attractive: the success of the model (that it 
facilitates a good explanation) turns on it having the right resemblance relation to the pump in 
question. In other contexts, the mass-flow equation is a preliminary model. As we saw in the last 
section, under such circumstances the model has a different model-world relationship insofar as 
its success does not turn on it resembling the target system (at least, on the fictionalist 
understandings of ‘resemblance’ and ‘target’ I have discussed). It seems reasonable to say that, 
when it is put to different uses, the content of the mass-flow equation changes. Content being 
relative to use is, as we shall see, a central component of artifacts. It is my claim that 
understanding models qua tools is deeper, more unified and more metaphysically kosher than 
understanding models qua fictions. I’ll start by explaining what tools are. I will then attempt to 
answer the semantic and model-world questions by equating models with tools. In the next 
section, I’ll turn to the metaphysical question. 
                                                             
8 A referee makes the fascinating suggestion that instead of considering these are different models, 
we instead take them as different stages in the life of a single model. I think taking models in such a 
dynamic way fits nicely with the account I provide in the next section, but it is not obvious to me how such 
a move might provide a way out of the two problem cases I present for fictionalists. 
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Some philosophers (particularly Amie Thomasson, 1999) have argued that some apparently 
problematic objects such as fictional characters are abstract artifacts. By ‘abstract’, they mean 
lacking spatio-temporal location, rather than possessing only structural properties. On such 
views, fictional characters are something like platonic objects which bear concrete properties, 
but differ insofar as they are created. I want to distinguish the view I am exploring here from 
such cases, and so will stipulate a class of artifacts: ‘tools’9.  
Tools are a kind of artifact, specifically material objects which are used to manipulate other 
material objects10. Sewing needles, for instance, allow us to convert pelts and other materials to 
tailored clothing. Tools are often designed, but are not necessarily so. Both a hammer and a rock 
can be used as a hammer. The suitability of a tool depends upon its material properties and the 
task at hand. The size of a needle’s eye, for instance, is more or less appropriate depending on 
the diameter of thread used. Two kinds of content attach to tools, then. There are truth-apt 
propositions about a tool’s material features: the weight and size of a needle, the radius of its 
eye, and so forth. But there are also (what I will call) success conditions. Some features of a tool 
are relevant to meeting success conditions and others are not. A set of tools frequently discussed 
by philosophers of science are instruments such as telescopes, spectrometers, and so forth. The 
philosophy of artifacts has some helpful conceptual machinery, which I’ll co-opt. 
Although paradigm artifacts—sewing needles, hammers—are material objects, they are also 
intentional. They are creations, ontologically dependent on their creators (Hilpinen 1992, 
Thomasson 2007). However, the creator of an artifact need not actually change the artifact’s 
                                                             
9 I’m not sure whether we should take ‘fictions’, generally speaking, to be tools, as there may be 
contexts where the content of a fiction is not sensitive to its use. However, it is part of my view that the 
sense of fictions relevant to scientific modelling can be captured by the notion of ‘tool’ I develop. Further, 
different notions of fiction might be more-or-less conducive to being captured in tool-like-terms. Walton’s 
view is particularly amenable—props are reasonably considered tools to aid imagination. So far as I can tell, 
my view doesn’t turn on these issues. 
10 My use of the term ‘tool’ is stipulative, although identifying tools with material objects follows 
Fiebleman 1967.  
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material properties—one simply has to put it to the relevant use. By using a stone to hammer in 
tent pegs, I use the stone as a hammer. As such, I can understand the properties of tools in terms 
of some function F: some properties are relevant for the object’s suitability for F and others are 
not. I’ll call these relevant properties F-properties. The size of a sewing-needle’s eye is an F-
property, as different sizes are more-or-less appropriate for being threaded by different 
materials. A sewing needle’s colour is irrelevant for this purpose, and so is not an F-property in 
this context.  
We can evaluate the success of an artifact on the basis of three criteria (paraphrased from 
Hillipinen 2011). First, the degree of fit between the intended object and the object’s actual 
character. That is, did the creator make what they intended to? Second, the degree of fit 
between the intended object’s F-properties and its function. That is, whether the object the 
creator intended to make would be suitable for their purpose. Third, the degree of fit between 
the actual object’s F-properties and F. Roughly, does the actual object do what we want it to? We 
can, then, distinguish between two classes of claims about tools: claims about material 
properties, and F-claims—claims which link the properties of an artifact to its purpose via the 
three criteria. 
So, tools are a kind of artifact: they are built, intentional (that is, functional) objects. Tools 
have two kinds of properties: material features and functional features, F-properties. Material 
features are simply the properties of the tool qua material object. Tools have a weight, a 
constitution, they behave in certain ways, and so forth. F-properties are the physical features 
combined with a ‘suitability for’ condition—F-claims—where suitability is indexed to whatever it 
is the tool is being used for.  
Recall the distinction between a model’s vehicle and content. The vehicle is the medium 
through which the content is expressed. To take models as tools, we identify a standard tool’s 
‘material features’ with the features of the vehicle, and F-properties with the model’s content. 
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The F-properties are the subset of the vehicle-properties which can be appropriately coupled with 
‘suitability-for’ claims. For instance, my father’s hydraulic line diagrams may be sketched using 
various colours—colour, then, is a vehicle-property—however, it is not typically an F-property as 
colour does not facilitate the diagram fulfilling its purpose. Its 2-dimensionalism is often an F-
property, as the added simplicity allows better understanding of the relevant features of pump 
design. This move allows us to answer the semantic question and the model-world question, as 
follows. 
The semantic question asks us to understand claims about models. When my father says “the 
pressure is proportional to the square of the flow”, we want this claim to come out as true, even 
though it is strictly speaking false when taken as a claim about pressure and flow in the world. On 
the tool view, this should be read in reference to the model’s vehicle. That is, the truth conditions 
for the claim turn on the properties of the vehicle and where relevant to how we construe those 
properties. These are not restricted to F-properties. My father’s statement about pressure and 
flow picks out the relationship between two variables identified as ‘pressure’ and ‘flow’ in the 
model. It is true, just in case the stated relationship between the variables is instantiated in the 
relevant vehicle. That is, do the correct physical manipulations of the tool (carrying out 
calculations on paper, running a computer simulation, etc.…) result in the relevant behavior? If 
so, the claim is confirmed. 
The model-world question asks us how it is that models tell us about the world. On the tool 
view, models tell us about the world in virtue of being adequate for some purpose. That is, their 
F-properties promote the kind of model output which is desired. These are enormously varied. In 
many contexts—those which fictionalists focus on—the function of the model is to serve as a 
representation in Walton’s sense. In explaining why a pipe has certain properties, my father 
might refer to the model claim that “the pressure is proportional to the square of the flow”. In 
this context, the model’s aim is usefully understood as acting as a prop in a game of make-
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believe, or as a modified, exaggerated description of the actual well system. However, in other 
contexts the model might act as a calculating device, or a way of cleaning data, or as a 
repurposable object, or so on. In these contexts, the model’s success turns on the criteria 
discussed above.  
For instance, consider preliminary models. In our case study, these include the simple mass-
flow equation, and the more complex model used to determine Ptmax (the maximal required 
pressure to get water into the tank). In the last section, I argued that taking these as generating 
(partially) true statements about the world, or licencing property comparisons, doesn’t capture 
how they tell us about the world. They are world-directed in virtue of being the basis of—a 
scaffold for—further models. On the tool view, we can understand preliminary models in terms 
of their function, that is, the relationship between F and the model’s F-properties. For preliminary 
models in engineering, F is the facilitation of the construction of further models which will 
determine the ultimate properties of what is being designed or selected. The F-properties in 
question, then, are those features of the model in virtue of which it is a good scaffold. The model 
determining Ptmax takes into account some of the features which will eventually matter for the 
pump’s construction, such as draw-down amount and the distance from the (assumed) pump 
discharge point to the floor, however it misses other necessary components such as seasonal 
well characteristics, atmospheric pressure, etc.… The point of determining Ptmax in isolation of 
these other factors is in part to simplify the selection process, and to narrow the search space. 
The model is a good one insofar as its F-properties (that it takes into account draw-down, but 
ignores atmospheric pressure, say) facilitate those functions. It doesn’t succeed in virtue of 
representing the pump which is ultimately selected, but by aiding in the construction of models 
which do, and by enabling an appropriate dynamic relationship with the design and construction 
processes themselves. 
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Notice that, on this view, we can happily accommodate fictionalism (and recall that my 
objection to fictionalism turns on the idea that fictionalism is supposed to be a complete account 
of modeling!). There are some uses to which we put objects that involve taking them to have 
representational content. Under such circumstances—when we use a model to explain the 
behavior of a target system, for instance—the F-properties that matter are those which make for 
a good representation. In short, what makes for a good prop. Moreover, this is amenable to both 
direct and indirect views. On an indirect view, we take the model descriptions as props, while on 
the direct view the target itself plays this role. In either case, they can be conceived of as material 
objects repurposed as representational tools. The basic features of Walton’s account are 
available. However, tools need not be representational, and so neither do models.  
It is time to turn to the metaphysical question. 
7. Models as material objects 
Something may have struck you as odd in the last section: I defined ‘tools’ as material 
objects, not merely concrete objects, the bearers of non-structural properties, but as material 
objects. I want to explore taking this quite literally. As we have seen, Levy’s deflationary move is 
to identify the model system with the target system: literally speaking, there is no model system, 
but rather a description of the target, which emphasizes some aspects over others. In section 4 I 
argued that this view was problematic for preliminary models: their success does not turn on 
describing targets, but rather on scaffolding further model construction. The position I want to 
explore is similarly deflationary, but avoids this kind of objection. I suggest that in some 
circumstances we should equate the model system with the model’s vehicle (or description). It is 
an open question whether vehicles are necessarily material, but it’s worth examining a view 
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which takes them to be. Which is to say, could models be, properly speaking, just the inscription 
of the equation, or the mental operations and imaginings, or the instantiated software, etc.?11  
Many philosophers have emphasized the materiality of models, often while providing 
similarly pragmatic accounts to mine (Parker 2009, 2011, Boumans 2012, Knuuttila 2011). I don’t 
think incorporating materiality is necessary for capturing modeling practice—fictionalist appeals 
to ‘props’, it strikes me, happily accommodate this—however, taking them as material objects is 
amenable to a deflationary metaphysics about models. 
Consider the mass-flow equation. This is realized by many model descriptions: a scribbled 
inscription, in prose, as an equation, instantiated by computer software, mentally represented, 
and so forth. By the tool-view, we equate models with vehicles. In each realization, we can 
understand the model in terms of that material object’s (the model description’s) behavior. In a 
computer, various physical components, microchips, processors, etc., undergo particular 
processes and produce particular behaviors depending on how we program and manipulate 
them. Pen-and-paper models are perhaps best understood as being coupled with cognitive 
processing. In solving an equation by hand, the inscriptions and my brain activity interact such 
that regular behaviors emerge. In each case, it seems coherent to understand the model—the 
tool in question—as a vehicle, and the vehicle as being a material object.  
By this view there is not, metaphysically speaking, a ‘model’ independent of the model 
description and target system. There is a vehicle, and there are the functions to which vehicles 
are put. We equate the model with its vehicle, and take that object as a tool with F-properties 
relating to the target. 
                                                             
11 I take Wendy Parker’s (2009) argument that we understand simulation studies as manipulations of 
actual physical systems—typically the computers on which the studies are run—to be suggestive of this 
kind of view. 
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Is equating models with vehicles sufficient to make them material? Not necessarily. I’ve 
described tools as material objects: instantiated, complex and boasting spatio-temporal location. 
This is uncontroversial concerning hammers and sewing needles, and presumably also for 
physical models—but surely this is an odd thing to say about mathematical models. Here, it might 
be tempting to draw the notion of a model’s vehicle apart from its physical realization, to say that 
an equation can be represented in many different mediums, but its representational content—
the object which bears that content—is mathematical rather than material or concrete. Deciding 
whether material or mathematical objects ‘bear’ mathematical content depends on answers to 
questions about the nature of mathematical truth, questions which are above my paygrade in 
this context. Suffice to say, nominalist or anti-realist answers to that question would allow us to 
identify vehicles with model descriptions, as would views which take mathematical truth to be 
‘contained’ in material objects. Even if we admit abstract vehicles in some mathematical 
contexts, the tool view still has the advantage of accommodating preliminary and procedural 
models. There are two related objections I want to cover. 
First, the ‘models-as-vehicles’ view is counterintuitive. Imagine my father scribbles otherwise 
identical equations on two separate pieces of paper. Surely these are instances of the same 
model, as opposed to two different models as my account demands. There appears to be 
differences in how we intuitively treat objects like sewing needles and models—we are keener to 
distinguish between needle-tokens than we are between model-tokens. 
Second, some philosophers take it that a criterion for a successful account of models and 
modeling is their individuation (see Weisberg 2013 & Frigg 2010). That is, tell us when two models 
count as the same model, and when they are different models. On the face of it, this makes 
trouble for my account: if models are vehicles, then it doesn’t seem as if there is a way of unifying 
them. If I write an equation using paper, or enter it into a computer, surely these are examples of 
the same model. But on my view this can’t be right, as both models have different material 
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constitution: one is made of paper and graphite, the other of silica. Moreover, the individuation 
of models helps facilitate communication about, and the study of, models—it helps solve 
epistemic issues. 
These objections are too quick, however. Tools are a classic classifiable object. Sewing 
needles are categorized based on their different points: ball-point needles are ideal for knit 
fabrics due to do not separating fibres, while regular-point needles are used for woven fabrics. 
Restricting ourselves to needles for hand-sewing, various types of needle with various lengths, 
bendability, sharpness and eye-size are distinguished. These include long, thick, darning needles 
with large eyes, long thin beading needles, and curved upholstery needles. There is nothing at all 
mysterious about these classifications: needle-kinds are classified in terms of physical properties 
and intended purposes. And just the same may be said for models. That is, there are many very 
similar tokens of model types, such as inscriptive and software versions of the mass-flow 
equation. However, this range of apparently very disparate vehicles share relevant F-properties, 
and so are both suitable for various uses and categorizable on that basis. They are tokens of the 
same model type in virtue of having relevantly similar F-properties. This enables the kind of 
individuation which is required for the epistemology of modeling. It is not in virtue of any old 
vehicle-properties that two models are of the same type, but in virtue of those vehicle properties 
which are properly coupled to the model’s use; its F-properties. 
Regardless, I am not moved to see the individuation of models as a metaphysically deep 
issue. Like paradigm tools, models are used in such a variety of ways, and are often so easily 
repurposed, that answering when two models are ‘the same’ looks like a pragmatic, as opposed 
to metaphysical, question. 
8. Conclusion 
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Philosophers concerned with modeling often stress the importance of capturing their use in 
practice—and indeed modellers do often interact with, discuss, and conceive of their model in 
fictionalist ways. And so an account of modeling must be sensitive to this. However, I have 
argued that fictionalism is incomplete: as an overall account of scientific modeling the view is 
insufficient. It is insufficient because some model purposes are not fictional, which is to say do 
not involve acting as props in games of make-believe. Instead, we should identify models with 
their vehicles, (potentially) material objects which are suitable for particular tasks. That is, models 
are tools. The crucial advantage of the tool-based account, in my view, is its capacity to flexibly 
account for both fictional and non-fictional models. As such, it provides a better overall picture of 
the practice. 
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